

The Structure and Distribution of Features in Hermogenes' *Peri Ideon Logou*

By Samuel Douglas

Abstract:

Hermogenes' *Peri Ideon Logou*, "On the Essential Qualities of Speech" has been both incredibly influential and remarkably hard to interpret. It lays out seven main stylistic concepts (*Ideai*) that can comprise up to twenty different conceptual categories, each with their own characteristic features. The categories are, however, heterogenous, and it is not easy to reconcile concepts such as Rapidity (γοργότης) and Truth (ἀλήθεια) as belonging to a consistent analytical system. Furthermore, the groupings of the *Ideai* can be difficult to parse, with types such as Grandeur (μέγεθος) and Character (ἥθος) encompassing large and disparate groups.

The categories are defined by characteristic features: Thoughts, Approaches, Word choice, Figures, Clause Types, and various rhythmical considerations. By mapping the relationships between these features this paper seeks to understand the stylistic connections between the *Ideai* through comparison of their features and establish two main facts. First, that thoughts are the predominant features by which the *Ideai* are grouped, representing strategic ideals rather than stylistic categories. Second, that this distinction reveals a three-part division in Hermogenes' categories that may help to explain the occasional incongruities in his statements about the *Ideai* and help better explain the usefulness of his text to ancient readers.

Introduction – A Basic Overview of the *Ideai*

The most influential of Hermogenes' surviving texts, *On the Essential Qualities of Speech* (Περὶ ἰδεῶν λόγου), attempts to classify the ideal qualities that a writer or speaker should aim at.¹ In practice,

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this becomes a list of between seven and twenty types that typify the style of Demosthenes. However, the categories are heterogenous: Clarity (*σαφήνεια*), Purity (*καθαρότης*), Distinctness (*εύκρινεια*), Greatness (*μέγεθος*), Dignity (*σεμνότης*), Roughness (*τραχυτής*), Vehemence (*σφοδρότης*), Brilliance (*λαμπρότης*), Climax (*ἀκμή*), Expansiveness (*περιβολή*), Beauty through deliberate arrangement (*ἐπιμέλεια/κάλλος*), Rapidity (*γοργότης*), Character (*ἥθος*), Simplicity (*ἀφέλεια*), Pleasantness (*γλυκύτης*), Bitterness (*δριμύτης*), Reasonableness (*ἐπιείκεια*), Truth (*ἀλήθεια*), Disgruntlement (*βαρύτης*), and Shrewdness (*δεινότης*).² Some of the terms would seem at first glance to refer to the speech itself (Distinctness, Beauty, Rapidity), others to the speaker (Dignity, Disgruntlement, Shrewdness), others to forms of argumentation (Character). In particular, Climax seems to apply to a very particular part of the speech. In the early sections of the treatise, Hermogenes gives a list as follows:

Φημὶ τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸν Δημοσθενικὸν λόγον τὰ ποιοῦντά ἔστιν, εἰ μέλλοι τις ὡς ἐν ἀπαντα ἀκούσεσθαι, τάδε· σαφήνεια, μέγεθος, κάλλος, γοργότης, ἥθος, ἀλήθεια, δεινότης· λέγω δὲ ὡς ἐν ταύτα πάντα οἰονεὶ συμπεπλεγμένα καὶ δι’ ἀλλήλων ἥκοντα· τοιούτος γὰρ ὁ λόγος ὁ Δημοσθενικός. τούτων δὲ τῶν Ἰδεῶν αἱ μὲν ἐφ’ ἔαυτῶν εἰσὶ καὶ καθ’ ἔαυτὰς συνιστάμεναι, αἱ δὲ ἔχουσιν ὑφ’ ἔαυτάς τινας ἄλλας ιδέας ὑποβεβηκίας, δι’ ὃν δὴ γίνονται, αἱ δὲ κοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλήλαις μέρει τινὶ ἢ καὶ μέρεσιν.

I say then that the speech typical of Demosthenes, if one is inclined to listen to it in its entirety is made up of these: Clarity, Greatness, Beauty, Rapidity, Character, Truth, Shrewdness. I say this as all of these exist as if intertwined and coming through one another, for such is the speech of Demosthenes. For of these *Ideai*, some are on their own and grouped together, others have beneath themselves other *Ideai* subordinated to them, through which they are manifested. Some share with others a certain part or parts.

² Just as the definitions of each term have been the subject of much debate, with the most recent English standard translations being those in Wooten (1987) and Rutherford (1998) 8, the exact translations have been equally contested. Here I have aimed for terms with broader or more neutral English resonance, hence, for example, “Truth” over Wooten’s “Sincerity” or Rutherford’s “Veracity” for ἀλήθεια. For βαρύτης (literally ‘heaviness’) Wooten (1987) uses the translation ‘Indignation’; followed by Heath (1995) 88; Heath (1995) 261; Du Toit (2014). Dilts and Kennedy (1997) 81 suggest that in Aspines it refers to speech compelled by circumstance, which does correspond to some aspects of this but more so to Reasonableness with which it shares many features. The precise translation of δεινότης varies in scholarship: Wooten uses ‘Force’, Rutherford ‘Power’, Patterson (2015) 6–7, 44–68 ‘Gravity’ (Following Scaliger), Conley (1987) 432 advocates for Johannes Sturm’s ‘Decorum’. For translations in earlier scholarship, see Lindberg (1977) 10–12.

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The types are variously interrelated, with some being derivative of others, some being *sui generis*.

Seven types are listed above, and these are typically considered primary in some sense, although how these relate is not universally agreed upon even among commentators of late antiquity.⁴ It is clear from the outset that the longer list of *Ideai* contains some ideas that are component parts or subordinate elements of the *Ideai* on the shorter list.⁵ It is also clear from its treatment that Shrewdness (*δεινότης*) is a radically distinct concept, and that it predominantly concerns itself with the proper application of other *Ideai*. For this reason it will not be part of this study.

What do the *Ideai*, then, represent? Hermogenes must have a firm idea of what the *Ideai* are, and it must be reasonably consistent. He states that the categories are clear.⁶ Are these *Ideai*, then, primarily stylistic categories?⁷ This has been the general assumption of recent scholarship on the topic, and not without reason. The *Ideai* are generally described as being made up of features that are primarily concerned with style rather than, for example, argumentation. But, as we will see, the connections between the grouped *Ideai* are far from obvious to the modern reader, both in respect to the top-level aesthetic concepts and to their specified ornamental components.

³ Please note that the reference numbers refer to Rabe’s Teubner edition.

⁴ Syrianus (5th C.), for example, in his commentary understands the quality Truth (*ἀλήθεια*) to be both primary and indivisible. Michael Psellos (11th C.) in the *Synopsis of Hermogenes* regards Truth to be a subset of Character alongside Disgruntlement, (*Synopsis of Hermogenes* 378–79) for which see Walker (2001), but a different structure would seem to be presented in his epistolatory *Synopsis of the Rhetorical Forms* which also takes Truth to be indivisible (156), for which see Papaioannou (2017). The confusion persists in more recent scholarship, for which see Lindberg (1977) 17–18; 81–82; Patillon (1997) 112–14. For discussions of the concept of divisibility in Hermogenes and Syrianus, see Stavelas (2014) 11–15.

⁵ This paper will focus on the potential groupings according to features which do not always correspond to the implicit or explicit subordination in Hermogenes’ text. For a list of the *Ideai* and the explicit groupings of them as subordinate see the list of the *Ideai* and their characteristic thoughts below.

⁶ See, for example, statements such as *Peri Ideon* 216 οἶμαι γὰρ θαυμάσεσθαι δὲ εἰκότως μᾶλλον τινας ἡμᾶς διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἐπ' εὑκρινεῖσθαι τὸν ἐπιτιμήσεως ἔνεκα τούτων ἀξίους νομιεῖν, μόνον εἰ προσέχειν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς ἐθελήσαιεν. “For I think that you will therefore rather admire [my work], and most of all admire it on account of its clarity, rather than consider it deserving of censure on account of this, if only you are willing to pay attention to each and every detail.”

⁷ Style is a remarkably imprecise term in English, as it can in reference to public speaking refer to anything from pronunciation of a phoneme to the speaker’s overall philosophy of aesthetics. While I will try to use more precise terms, this will in general refer to *how a thing is written* in contrast to *what is being said*.

Hermogenes’ *Ideai* are comprised of a hierarchical distribution of features, as can be seen from early in the text:⁸

Ἄπας τοίνυν λόγος ἔννοιάν τε ἔχει πάντως τινὰ ἡ ἔννοιάς καὶ μέθοδον περὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν καὶ λέξιν, ἡ τούτοις ἐφήρμοσται. τῆς δὲ αὗτης λέξεως ἔχούσης πάντως τινὰ καὶ αὐτῆς ἴδιότητα πάλιν αὖ σχήματά τέ ἐστι τινα καὶ καλα συνθέσεις τε καὶ ἀναπαύσεις καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν συνιστάμενον ὁ ῥυθμός. ἡ γὰρ ποιὰ σύνθεσις τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν καὶ τὸ ὀδιό πως ἀναπεπαῦσθαι τὸν λόγον ἀλλὰ μὴ ὀδιό ποιεῖ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀλλὰ μὴ τοιόνδε εἶναι τὸν ῥυθμόν.

Accordingly, all speech certainly has some Thought (*Ennoia*) or Thoughts, and an approach concerning the Thought, and Style (*Lexis*) which is fitting for these. Since style assuredly has certain features proper to it, there are also again Figures (*Schemata*), Clauses (*Kola*), Word Order (*Synthesis*), Clausula (*Anapauseis*), and Rhythm as composed of the previous two. For a particular arrangement of the parts of speech and how one pauses speech in one place and not another causes the rhythm to be one way and not otherwise.

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Hermogenes observes this structure throughout, with some notable exceptions.⁹ It is especially common in subtypes, that is to say those *Ideai* not among the list of primary *Ideai* (for which see the first quotation from *Peri Ideon* 218), for Hermogenes to give a general indication of certain distinguishing features, and then mention that all other features correspond to that of a larger group. For example, the chapter on Pleasantness (*γλυκύτης*) is predominantly filled with discussions of the characteristic Thoughts and subject matter, two distinct Figures (the use of epithets and quotations from poets), and then states that the Figures and stylistic features of Simplicity, Purity (*καθαρότης*) and Beauty are appropriate, along with the rhythms of Dignity (*σεμνότης*). These, naturally suggest a close association between these *Ideai*, but evidently the shared elements are of less importance than the stated essential features. This passage also suggests that the characteristic Thought is the primary element of the *Idea*.

⁸ This paper, for the sake of clarity, will capitalise the terms Thought, Approach, Style, Figure, Clause, Word Order, Clausula and Rhythm when they are used as Hermogenes’ concepts *Ennoia*, *Methodos*, *Lexis*, *Schema*, *Kola*, *Synthesis*, *Anapausis*, and *Rhythmos* respectively as well as the names of the *Ideai*.

⁹ For the history of this hierarchy, see Patillon (1997) 114–24; Rutherford (1998) 12–16. Some comments on Hermogenes’ predecessors will be given in the conclusion

That the primary consideration of the *Idea* is not the ornamental quality of its style but rather the Thought and strategic goals is preserved in Syrianus’ commentary:

ἰδέα δέ ἐστι ποιότης λόγου τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἀρμόδιος προσώποις τε καὶ πράγμασι κατά τε ἔννοιαν καὶ λέξιν καὶ τὴν ὅλην τῆς ἀρμονίας διαπλοκήν.

An *Idea* is a quality of speech appropriate to the established character and matter at hand according to the thought and diction and whole intermixture of harmony.

Syrianus *Comment. Herm.* 2.16–19.

This quote comes early in the commentary and sets the readers’ expectations. The *Idea* will be concerned with style, but categorised according to character and situation. Syrianus likely has in mind the passage early in Hermogenes’ *Peri Staseon* giving a similar definition before moving into organisation, Τὴν δὲ ἀμφισβήτησιν ταύτην ἀνάγκη περί τε πρόσωπα γίνεσθαι καὶ πράγματα. (“Necessity creates the matter of dispute concerning both the characters and the affair at hand” *Peri Staseon* 1.20–21), although the division by this point has become commonplace and the term *πρόσωπα* for a figure in a speech is part of the general vocabulary of rhetorical writing.¹⁰ The *Idea* for Syrianus is, therefore, some quality of speech necessary for a given argumentative tactic.

Grouping the *Ideai* according to their Thoughts in the *Ideai*

The Thoughts (ἔννοια) of each *Idea* can be summarised as such with the “primary” *Idea* listed alongside the component or subordinate types where this subordination is explicit in Hermogenes’ text:

<i>Idea</i>	Component <i>Idea</i>	Characteristic Thought
σαφήνεια	καθαρότης	Direct <i>Peri Ideon</i> 227, Childish 323
	εὐκρίνεια	Background 236, Discussion of Structure 236
μέγεθος	σεμνότης	Myth 242, Universal/Natural 244, Glorious Deeds 245–46
	τραχυτής	Reproach 255
	σφοδρότης	Reproach 260
λαμπρότης		Confidence 264, Glorious Deeds 265

¹⁰ For the earlier history of the term, see Clay (1998) 17; 36–38.

ἀκμή	Reproach 269	
περιβολή	Generalities 278, Extraneous Detail 281	
κάλλος	None ¹¹	
γοργότης	None ¹²	
ἥθος	ἀφέλεια	Direct 322, Trivial 325, Analogy to Nature 325
	γλυκύτης	Description of Pleasant Things 333
	δριμύτης	Sharpness 328
	ἐπιείκεια	Lowered Expectations 345, Stating Compulsion 346
ἀλήθεια		(as ἀφέλεια, 352), Anger 353
βαρύτης	None	

The crossovers between characteristic Thoughts tend to follow top-level parallels in the *Ideai*. Climax (ἀκμή), Roughness (τραχυτής) and Vehemence (σφοδρότης) all have a common theme of reproach (255–56, 260–61, 270). Roughness and Vehemence vary only in the relationship between the speaker and the target. In the case of Roughness the target is a social inferior, in Vehemence a superior.¹³ Climax, can employ the characteristic thoughts of either. These three are all subtypes of Greatness (μέγεθος). Similar thoughts, although not explicitly related are employed in Truth (ἀλήθεια) and Disgruntlement (βαρύτης). Thoughts related to the mythological or the divine are used in both Dignity, and Pleasantness (γλυκύτης), although perhaps with a slightly different focus. Dignity has a focus on oaths, prayers, and statements about grand things, while Pleasantness tends to dwell on poetic themes for the sake of beauty. Truth is stated to share the characteristic Thoughts of Simplicity (ἀφέλεια).¹⁴ And it similarly shares the approach of using oaths.

¹¹ It is explicitly stated in *Peri Ideon* 298 that Beauty has no characteristic thoughts.

¹² Hermogenes rejects the possible characteristic thoughts of Rapidity (γοργότης), in *Peri Ideon* 312.

¹³ See the opening to the section on Vehemence, *Peri Ideon* 260: Ή δὲ σφοδρότης ἐννοίας μὲν ἔχει καὶ αὐτὴ τὰς ἐπιτιμητικὰς καὶ ἐλεγκτικὰς καθάπερ ἡ τραχύτης. ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν τραχύτης κατὰ μειόνων προσώπων καὶ αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν δικαστῶν ἡ ἐκκλησιαστῶν γίνεται, ὡς ἐδείξαμεν, ἡ δὲ σφοδρότης κατὰ ἐλαττόνων προσώπων, οἷον κατὰ τῶν ἀντιδίκων ἡ καθ’ ὃν ἀν καὶ οἱ ἀκούοντες δέξαιντο ἥδεως... (“The characteristic thoughts of Vehemence are likewise criticism and cross-examination, just as in Roughness, However, Roughness is created concerning more important people, and the members of the jury and members of the assembly, as we have shown, but Vehemence concerns less important figures, such as the opponent, or those whom the listeners might point at with pleasure...”).

¹⁴ *Peri Ideon* 352.

Undoubtedly, then, the Thought, as conceived of by Hermogenes relates strongly to the mode of argumentation and approach. Indeed, the thoughts as given in each section are generally relevant to content, argumentation, or character.¹⁵ The emphasis placed on the *Ennoia* and their focus on non-stylistic aspects would seem to speak against a stylistic organisation, especially since the parallels in the specified thoughts tend to align with the overarching categories Greatness and Character (ἡθος). This alignment between top-level organisation and the Thoughts reinforces the sense that characteristic Thoughts are the primary elements for the *Ideai*.

Discontinuities Between Content Based and Stylistic groupings

The top-level organisation of the *Ideai*, then, represents categories according to content and strategy. Does this categorisation align with the stylistic elements? We can disregard Approaches, which tend not to display parallels between *Ideai*. The distinction between an Approach and a Figure is broadly predicated on the specificity of the feature: an Approach implemented through specific parts of a sentence becomes a Figure.¹⁶ More information can be gleaned from the distribution of Figures, which are undoubtedly more aligned with ornament than content. In the Figures, the parallels and divisions suggest a radically different structure. A sharp division can be seen, firstly, in

¹⁵ A non-exhaustive list. Those referring to content: Mythological material (*Peri Ideon* 219, 242); Use of extensive background (236); Themes of Natural Science (244); Moral Philosophy (245); Glorious History (246); Glorious Achievements (265); Extraneous Detail (281, which is of course related to certain stylistic effects); Trivial Themes (324); Description of Pleasant things (331); Description of Love (333). Those referring to argumentation: Explanation of structure (236); Open Reproach (255, 260, 269 which may also display character); Proof by Analogy (325); Lowering Expectations (345). Those referring to character: Confidence (264); Childish Thoughts (323); Presenting oneself as if acting under compulsion (346); Anger (353).

¹⁶ For example, there are several Approaches that discuss sequence, as in the suggestion of the use of logical over chronological sequences or refutations in sequence in Distinctness (εὐκρίνεια *Peri Ideon* 235–38) or in the reversal of logical sequence in Expansiveness (περιβολή, 282) or the lack of sequence due to emotion in Truth (ἀλήθεια, 357). Contrast these with the Figures: use of enumeration for structure in Distinctness (238), expansion through explanation (290), aposiopesis, or the breaking of sequence in Truth (361). Figures are therefore often specific implementations of Approaches, although the distinction was clearly debated in antiquity, as, for example, Hermogenes feels the need to defend his definition of narration as an Approach (227). Other areas of overlap include the role of confidence and hesitation in the Approach of Brilliance (266), and Dignity (246), where in Truth it is part of a Figure as part of doubt (*diaporesis*, 361) and judgement (*epikresis*, 361).

the use of structure and subdivision. Straightforward grammar is specified as a feature of Purity (καθαρότης), as here:

Σχῆμα δὲ καθαρότητος ἡ ὁρθότης. «έγὼ γάρ, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι, προσέκρουσα ἀνθρώπῳ πονηρῷ καὶ φίλαπεχθήμονι»...

εἰ γὰρ πλαγιάσαις, κανὸν ἀφηγή, πάντως περιβαλεῖς. ἐννοίας γὰρ ἄλλας ἐφέλκονται οἱ πλαγιασμοί.

Straightforward grammar is a figure of Purity, as “For I, O Athenians, was angry at an cowardly and quarrelsome man”...

For if you use oblique cases, even if you clearly show your direction, you will generally amplify, since the use of the oblique cases draws with it other thoughts.

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The examples and further discussion throughout this chapter of the *Peri Ideon* make it very clear that this refers to the use of the noun in the nominative case with an indicative verb to create a simple statement.¹⁷ Subordination of any kind is indicative of Expansiveness (περιβολή), conceived of as fundamentally opposed to Purity in this respect.¹⁸ Dignity (σεμνότης) also recommends straightforward grammar, and several other *Ideai* follow these two.¹⁹ Parenthesis (or *embole*) is similarly divided. Purity, Dignity and those *Ideai* that derive their basis from them recommend against it.²⁰ Expansiveness and Climax employ it, as does Rapidity (γοργότης).²¹ This grouping is paralleled in the use of asyndeton, used in Brilliance (λαμπρότης), Expansiveness, Climax, Rapidity and Truth.²² We can summarise the *Ideai* that explicitly discuss either subordination or parentheses like so:

¹⁷ To take one example, *Peri Ideon* 230 quotes Herodotus «Κροῖσος ἦν Λυδὸς μὲν γένος, παῖς δὲ Ἀλυάττεω, τύραννος δὲ ἐθνῶν» “Croesus was a Lydian by descent, son of Alyattes, king of the people”, in contrast to «Κροίσου ὅντος Λυδοῦ μὲν γένος, παῖδος δὲ Ἀλυάττεω, τυράννου δὲ ἐθνῶν τῶν ἐντὸς Ἀλυος ποταμοῦ» “Since Croesus was of Lydian birth, son of Alyattes, the king of the people on this side of the river Halys...”.

¹⁸ *Peri Ideon* 229.

¹⁹ *Peri Ideon* 250. Those that explicitly follow Purity in this respect are Simplicity (329), Pleasantness (219, 336), and Reasonableness (352).

²⁰ *Peri Ideon* 251.

²¹ *Peri Ideon* 270, 288, 314.

²² *Peri Ideon* 267, 270, 316, 318, 354.

	Subordination	No Subordination
Parenthesis	Expansiveness (περιβολή), Climax (ἀκμή)	Rapidity (γοργότης)
No Parenthesis	Brilliance (λαμπρότης)	Dignity (σεμνότης), Simplicity (ἀφέλεια), Reasonableness (ἐπιείκεια), Purity (καθαρότης), Pleasantness (γλυκύτης)

Evidently the two concepts follow one another, and since these elements are essential to Expansiveness we can see a closer relationship between Climax, Rapidity, Brilliance, and Expansiveness in their use of *Parenthesis* and subordination.²³ Structure at the level of the sentence is least coherent in Truth (ἀλήθεια), which takes an idiosyncratic approach; its Features *Aposiopesis*, breaking off a sentence part way through, and *epidiorthosis*, self-correction, go beyond the tendency for parenthesis into a complete breakdown of the structure of the passage. These elements are not shared with any other *Idea*.

A similar split can be seen in the modes of address recommended. *Apostrophe*, address by name, and *deiktikon*, address by pointing (i.e. “that man”) are the two forms of address commonly recommended in the *Ideai*. Those that use *apostrophe* are Vehemence (*Peri Ideon* 262, therefore implicitly Roughness, *τραχυτής* also), Climax (270), Rapidity (313), Pleasantness (γλυκύτης 270, and

²³ This is particularly interesting in light of the discussion of Brilliance and Rapidity throughout the *Peri Ideon*. Lindberg (1977) 92 highlights *Peri Ideon* 264.1–4, but this very clearly is an opposition in respect to certain features, namely clause length, and not a general opposition. However, as she notes, the opposition of the two at 280 is as clear a statement of opposition as any in the *Peri Ideon*. Wooten (1989) 582 regards Rapidity and Expansiveness as antithetical based on his reading of *Peri Ideon* 318: Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ δοκοῦντος μὲν τέμνειν τὰ πράγματα, οὐ μὴν τέμνοντός γε ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον καὶ περιβάλλοντος λόγου παράδειγμα τὸ... (Wooten’s 1987 translation: “The following is an example of a passage that seems to be concise (τέμνοντός) but is not so really, but in fact is abundant, which is the opposite of concise...”) This seems to me to be a misreading. Τέμνοντός is not synonymous with γοργότης, and we should read this as a specific split according to clause length.

by extension Bitterness, *δριμύτης*), and Truth (360, inherited from Vehemence).²⁴ Those that explicitly refuse *apostrophe* are Purity (251), Dignity (251), Simplicity (329), and Reasonableness (352). *Deiktikon* is primarily present in the more aggressive forms, Vehemence and Truth (and by extension Roughness), as follows:

No <i>Apostrophe</i>	<i>Apostrophe only</i>	<i>Apostrophe, Deiktikon</i>
Dignity (<i>σεμνότης</i>), Simplicity (<i>ἀφέλεια</i>), Reasonableness (<i>ἐπιείκεια</i>)	Climax (<i>ἀκμή</i>), Pleasantness (<i>γλυκύτης</i>), Bitterness (<i>δριμύτης</i>), Rapidity (<i>γοργότης</i>)	Roughness (<i>τραχυτής</i>), Vehemence (<i>σφοδρότης</i>), Truth (<i>ἀλήθεια</i>)

Expansiveness (*περιβολή*) and Beauty (*κάλλος*) do not discuss the topic. This division splits both of the larger groups, Greatness (*μέγεθος*) and Character (*ῆθος*) as such (associating, for the moment, Truth with Character):

	Apostrophe	No Apostrophe
Subordinate to Greatness	Roughness (<i>τραχυτής</i>), Vehemence (<i>σφοδρότης</i>), Climax (<i>ἀκμή</i>)	Dignity (<i>σεμνότης</i>)
Subordinate to Character	Pleasantness (<i>γλυκύτης</i>), (Bitterness, <i>δριμύτης</i>), Truth (<i>ἀλήθεια</i>)	Simplicity (<i>ἀφέλεια</i>), Reasonableness (<i>ἐπιείκεια</i>)

²⁴ In the case of Roughness and Bitterness, which have relatively few characteristic features, but which adhere closely to another type, the appropriate styles can be assumed from Vehemence and Pleasantness respectively.

Those lacking *apostrophe* are those that derive stylistically from Simplicity, a division that we shall see more as the various elements of the *Ideai* are inspected below. These two systematic divisions in the *Schema* are the clearest indications that the divisions according to Hermogenes’ top-level groupings are not reflective of the stylistic divisions in the text, instead they reflect the characteristic thoughts and the strategic choices of the orator. With this in mind, it would be sensible to analyse the *Ideai* according to the structure that exists within the text. The following sections will group them by feature, using the recommendations for *Lexis*, *Schema*, *Kola*, and *Rhythmos* that are given by Hermogenes.

Grouping the *Ideai* according to their Figures (σχήματά)

There are relatively few direct and explicit parallels between the sets of Figures assigned to each *Idea*, but the Figures, by sheer extent, give a different picture of the complex relationships between *Ideai*. There are four groups that can be made, alongside three *Ideai* that are not easily placed into a group based on their Figures.²⁵ The first is typified by Purity, and is comprised of Purity, Dignity, Simplicity (ἀφέλεια), Pleasantness (γλυκύτης), and Reasonableness (ἐπιείκεια). To this may be added Distinctness (εὐκρίνεια), since the Figures of the two are of a different type and they are meant to form a complimentary group producing the *Idea* Clarity (σαφήνεια). With the exception of Pleasantness and Distinctness, these share very few Figures with other *Ideai*. Judgements are a feature of Dignity, and Truth, but the examples of usage for the two are explicitly different. Likewise, Distinctness shares a tendency to enumerate and clearly divide sections with Expansiveness, but since this is not a feature of Purity (καθαρότης) or the other *Ideai* in this group the overlap is minimal.²⁶ Simplicity is stated to use the Figures appropriate to Purity in addition to some of its own, just as it employs the same Diction (λέξις). Likewise, Pleasantness and Reasonableness use this group of

²⁵ An earlier attempt was made by Lindberg (1977) to map the interrelation of the *Ideai* according to explicit cross-references in Hermogenes’ text while I have also included parallels in content that are not stated. The breadth of Lindberg’s analysis, undivided by feature, makes it unsuitable for systematic grouping, and indeed that is not her aim. Specific correspondences of note will be listed where relevant.

²⁶ The similarity between these two disparate *Ideai* is discussed in *Peri Ideon* 279–80.

features.²⁷ It is likely, due to its short entry and its position in the book, that Bitterness uses the same features, and that they have been omitted to avoid a fourth repetition. Since this is the largest group, it is easiest to see the are the Figures in tabulated format, with references to the places they are discussed:²⁸

	Purity	Clarity	Dignity	Expansiveness	Simplicity	Pleasantness	Bitterness	Reasonableness
Straightforward Grammar (<i>orthotes</i>)	229		250		329	219, 336		352
Enumeration		238		279, 288				
Division of whole into parts (<i>merismos aparithmesis</i>)		238		279, 288				
Repetition (<i>epanalepsis</i>)	239	239			329	336		352
Judgements (<i>epikresis</i>)			250					
Judgements with hesitation					250			
Lack of <i>apostrophe</i>	251		251		329			352
Lack of <i>parentheses</i>	251		251		329	336		352

Dignity also closely mirrors Simplicity in its preference for straightforward grammar (250), lack or parenthetical statements (251), and lack of *apostrophe* (direct address, 251). They vary in that Dignity recommends judgements (*epikresis*, 250), and Simplicity the use of repetition (*epanalepsis*, 239).²⁹ Hermogenes notes the similarities in several places, conflating the two as essentially a unified style with respect to their Figures and, as will be discussed below, their rhythmical tendencies. The preference for lack of parenthesis and avoidance of direct address puts Dignity at odd with the other subtypes of Greatness, which tend to employ these Figures.³⁰ The preference for direct grammatical

²⁷ *Peri Ideon* 329 and 352 respectively.

²⁸ Note that often these are wholesale adoptions of the Figures appropriate to another *Idea*.

²⁹ Hermogenes notes the similarities in his discussion of the differences between Dignity and Brilliance in 267–68.

³⁰ Direct address as *apostrophe* is a feature of Vehemence and Climax. Since this feature is explicitly a part of Vehemence it is a part of Roughness.

structures over subordination is a direct contrast between Dignity and Brilliance (λαμπρότης), and therefore by extension also Climax.³¹

The second grouping is that of Roughness and Vehemence, which are explicitly similar. Climax shares their features while also using the features of Brilliance. This interrelation speaks for the interrelation of Roughness/Vehemence and Brilliance in a broader sense.³² Certainly, in some passages there is a greater emphasis on mixing Brilliance and the more aggressive types beyond the simple creation of Climax.³³ However, Brilliance includes aspects of Expansiveness (περιβολή), and it is this aspect that is most emphasised in the discussion of Figures. Truth takes from Vehemence the forms of address *apostrophe* and *deiktikon*.³⁴ Through Climax, features are shared with several different *Ideai*, predominantly Expansiveness and Rapidity, but these have a very diverse set of Figures, and the link is predominantly through Brilliance;³⁵ the only one shared with Roughness and Vehemence is *apostrophe*, a feature of Rapidity. Selected correspondences with references are listed in the table below:

	Roughness	Vehemence	Brilliance	Climax	Abundance	Rapidity	Truth
Commands		258					
Rhetorical question (reproach)		258					
Apostrophe with Questions			262	270		313	360
Personal address (<i>deiktikon</i>)			263				360
Direct denials (<i>anairesis</i>)				267	270		
Starting afresh (<i>apostaseis</i>)				267	270		
Asyndeton (<i>symplokai</i>)				267	270	318	316
							357

³¹ *Peri Ideon* 267–68.

³² Lindberg argues for a sharper division between Dignity/Brilliance and Roughness/Vehemence in general (Lindberg (1977) 69–74). In the case of the Figures relevant to these, we should observe some of Hermogenes’ statements on the relation of Brilliance and Roughness/Vehemence that she notes, for example the opening of the section on Brilliance, *Peri Ideon* 264. Dignity and Brilliance do not share Figures, but the distinction Lindberg notes does come out when observing the rhythm and diction of each, as will be shown below.

³³ As, for example, 242.

³⁴ *Peri Ideon* 360–61.

³⁵ Asyndeton (*Peri Ideon* 316, 318) and Parenthesis (288, 294 and 314) are features of these and of Climax.

Although Climax shares many Figures with the Vehemence-group, Hermogenes focuses more on its connections to Brilliance than to Vehemence, since Climax is the product of the Figures that produce Vehemence and those that produce Brilliance. The closeness of this connection in general is indicated by Hermogenes’ comments on Dem. 18.48 and 18.71:

καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀπλῶς εἰς μῆκος ἀπολελύσθαι τὰ κῶλα, ἀλλ’ εἶναι μὲν τὸ δλον ἔν, δοκεῖν δὲ διακεκόφθαι ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς καὶ γεγενῆσθαι κομματικόν, οὔτε λαμπρότητος ὃν οὔτε ἀκμῆς σφοδρότητος δὲ μᾶλλον, τῷ τὴν σφοδρότητα τῆς μὲν λαμπρότητος ἀπηλλάχθαι πάντη, τῇ δὲ ἀκμῇ κατά τι κοινωνεῖν ἀκμαιότερον μᾶλλον ἢ λαμπρότερον πεποίηκε φαίνεσθαι τὸν λόγον.

And the clause-release is not done singly at full length, but the whole thing seems to be interspersed with interjections and made into tiny remarks, not in the manner of Brilliance, nor Climax, but Vehemence. With respect to all this, since Vehemence is quite distinct from Brilliance but shares some aspects with Climax, it makes the speech appear more Climactic than Brilliant.

Peri Ideon 277

It therefore seems reasonable to consider Climax to be closely related to Brilliance with respect to the schema. Naturally the closeness of these two groups through Climax, which is inherently a hybrid construction, could lead one to group the two together.

The fourth group is between Beauty (*κάλλος*) and Pleasantness (*γλυκύτης*), which takes many of its Figures from Beauty, although it is also closely connected to Simplicity as we have seen above.³⁶ It is remarkable that Beauty shares so few features with other *Ideai*, although some could be seen as an extension of other features. The focus on balanced clauses and parallelism throughout Beauty is, of course, a refinement of the tendency towards *μὲν / δὲ* balance in Distinctness (*εὐκρίνεια*) and Expansiveness.³⁷ Likewise the use of repetition and small variations expressed in a variety of ways is reflected in the repetitions and variations of Rapidity, but in both of these cases the complexity and

³⁶ *Peri Ideon* 339.

³⁷ Distinctness (*Peri Ideon* 239), Expansiveness (290–91), Beauty (276, 291, 299–305).

nature of the extensions make it clear that these Figures are of quite a different sort.³⁸ Brilliance and Climax are stated to somehow have an inherent element of Beauty, as *Peri Ideon* 302 states:

οὐδὲν δὲ θαυμαστόν, εἴ τι καὶ λαμπρὸν ἡ ἀκμαῖον ἔχει τὸ προειρημένον παράδειγμα. συγγένεια γὰρ λαμπρότητι πρὸς κάλλος ἐν ἀπαντι σχεδὸν πράγματι, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς ἀκμήν. τὰ γὰρ ἀκμαῖα τε καὶ ὥραῖα – καὶ σώματα καὶ ὅ τι βούλει – πάντως καὶ λαμπρὰ καὶ καλά, οὐ μὴν τὸ ἀνάπαλιν· καλὸν γὰρ δύναται τι καὶ μὴ ἀκμαῖον εἶναι μηδὲ λαμπρόν.

It is not unusual if something Brilliant or Climactic follows the aforementioned paradigm, since there Brilliance has a kinship towards Beauty in nearly all matters, and because of this there is also a kinship with Climax. For the climactic and timely – the main part of the speech and whatever else – is completely brilliant and beautiful, but the contrary is not true; for it is possible to be beautiful and not climactic nor brilliant.

Peri Ideon 302–303

This comes during a discussion of the Figures of Beauty. There are no features of Brilliance in any of the categories that are also explicitly attributed to Beauty. The sole exception to this are the shared stipulations on using long clauses which are not Figures proper.³⁹ Additionally, the ‘beautiful’ aspects of Brilliance are explicitly not those produced by adornment, the main focus of Beauty, that is to say adornment for its own sake rather than that inherent to beautiful ideas.⁴⁰ It seems likely that

³⁸ Both, in fact, employ polyptoton with small variations (*Peri Ideon* 306). *Rapidity*’s more general repetitions (303) recall the variety of studied ways for creating balance through repetition in Beauty (303–306).

³⁹ *Peri Ideon* 268, 272, 307.

⁴⁰ *Peri Ideon* 264. John Doxopatres (*Commentarium in Hermogenis librum περὶ ιδεῶν* 275.25–30, pages from Walz 1834 v. 6) suggests a distinction in that Beauty is over-adorned and Brilliance displays beauty by nature, presumably through inherent balance in clauses, clear patterns, etc... (see also 334.26–335.6). This is not inconsistent with Hermogenes’ descriptions, for example in *Peri Ideon* 234 which emphasizes the creation of beauty in Brilliance through noble thoughts. Hagedorn argues for a division between a more dignified and sublime form of beauty –represented by Brilliance– which corresponds closely to the “high-style” *arete κάλλος*, in Dionysius, (Hagedorn 1964: 42–43) but the examples given do not support this interpretation of Hermogenes’ work. For example, Dionysius’ statement, which Hagedorn cites, at *Dem.* 48.40–43 ἐνθυμηθεὶς δέ, ὥσπερ ἔφην, ὡς διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων θεωρημάτων ὅ τε ἡδὺς γίνεται λόγος καὶ δὲ καλός, ἐστικόπει πάλιν, τί ποτε ἦν τὸ αἴτιον, διτὶ τὰ αὐτὰ οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν ἦν ποιητικά, εὑρισκε δὴ τῶν τε μελῶν οὖσας διαφοράς ... (“Having considered, as already mentioned, that it is through these same rules that speech becomes sweet (ἡδὺς) and beautiful (καλός) [Demosthenes] was pondering again what the cause might be that the one poetic method was not like the other, and he found that their natures indeed differed with respect to tonal expression...”) does not present a parallel to the use of the terms Beauty (κάλλος) and Brilliance in Hermogenes, since these *Ideai* are not comparable with respect to their stylistic features as ἡδὺς and καλός are in Dionysius. Passages such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus *Dem.* 49.53–58 make it clear that while Beauty may be linked to grandeur in Dionysius, the distinction between speech that is καλός and that which is ἡδὺς is quite different from that between Beauty and Brilliance in

Hermogenes is here mixing terminology or making a comment on the frequent use of the two styles in combination with one another and that no direct connection of the Figures of the two can be made on this basis.

The three more independent types are Truth (*ἀληθεία*), Rapidity (*γοργότης*), and Expansiveness (*περιβολή*). The first of these, Truth, bears some relation with respect to the Figures to Vehemence (*σφοδρότης*) and Roughness, as noted in the section on these above, but in general it has more unique features than shared, and those aspects that are shared are generally part of broader divisions; it shares *apostrophe* and *deiktikon* with the Vehemence-group and *asyndeton* with the Brilliance group. These are some of the most broadly shared Figures.⁴¹ *Diaporesis*, doubt, *aposiopesis*, breaking off a sentence, *epidiorthosis*, self-correction, and *apolytos merismos* are all unique to Truth. It is not implausible that Disgruntlement (*βαρύτης*) shares the Figures of Truth, but this is ambiguous. Disgruntlement makes no individual claim to Figures and does not have the clear indicators of shared features through structure or placement as Bitterness (*δριψύτης*). The relative independence of Expansiveness within the Greatness-group (*μέγεθος*) makes its uniqueness here unsurprising.⁴² The *Schema* that it shares are few and have been discussed above, but its broad range of unshared Figures suggest independence. Rapidity likewise shares only Figures related to larger divisions and the aspect of rapid questioning that is also a feature of Truth.⁴³ Groupings can therefore be relatively easily created and summarised thus:

- Purity (*καθαρότης*), Dignity (*σεμνότης*), Simplicity (*ἀφέλεια*), Pleasantness (*γλυκύτης*), and Reasonableness (*ἐπιείκεια*)
- Roughness (*τραχυτής*) and Vehemence (*σφοδρότης*)

Hermogenes. The similarities are mainly parallels in vocabulary and suggest that beauty is being talked about in a more general sense.

⁴¹ For the distribution of these and the *Ideai* that use them, see above.

⁴² The relative independence of this *Idea* is discussed at *Peri Ideon* 242.

⁴³ As noted above, *Apostrophe* (*Peri Ideon* 313), *Asyndeton* (316), and *Parenthesis* (314) are all elements of Rapidity shared with larger groups. Rapid replies to objections (*Peri Ideon* 356) are shared with Truth. Other Figures of Rapidity are not shared.

- Brilliance (*λαμπρότης*) and Climax (*ἀκμή*)
- Beauty (*κάλλος*) and Pleasantness (*γλυκύτης*)
- Expansiveness (*περιβολή*)
- Rapidity (*γοργότης*)
- Truth (*ἀλήθεια*, and potentially Bitterness *δριμύτης*)

Grouping the *Ideai* according to rhythmic characteristics

Divisions according to word order, cadence, and rhythm, which comprise the interrelated rhythmic concerns of Hermogenes’ division, are relatively simple.⁴⁴ There are four groups with some few *Ideai* that cross categories. In short, these groups are: Those that follow Clarity (*σαφήνεια*), characterised by iambic and trochaic rhythms; those that follow Dignity, which are dactylic and anapestic with spondaic cadences; those that follow Roughness with inconsistent rhythm and clashing syllables; and finally those that follow Beauty with consistent (but unspecified) rhythm, but varied use of accentuation and an avoidance of hiatus. These groups are generally expressed through the webs of explicit references in the descriptions of the *Ideai*.

The rhythmic characteristics of each group can be summarised as follows:

Clarity (<i>σαφήνεια</i>)	Dignity (<i>σεμνότης</i>)	Roughness (<i>τραχυτής</i>)	Beauty (<i>κάλλος</i>)
Iambic/Trochaic Rhythm	Dactylic/Anapestic Rhythm		Consistent Rhythm, but unspecified
Iambic/Trochaic	Spondaic Clausulae, Avoid Catalectic	Inconsistent Clausulae, Avoids	Avoid Spondaic

⁴⁴ References for the passages that discuss these characteristics are listed below with the specific *Ideai* for each group.

Clausulae	Endings	Consistency	Clausulae
Some mixture	Relaxed/Loose Rhythm		Consistent Rhythm
		Harsh/Clashing Sounds	Avoidance of Hiatus
			Variation in accent placement

These groups are not explicitly stated by Hermogenes but tend to proceed from explicit cross-references in the text. The *Ideai* can thus be grouped as such:

- Clarity (*Peri Ideon* 232–33), both Purity and Distinctness, Rapidity (319), Simplicity (329), Reasonableness (352), Disgruntlement (368), (*Bitterness*, assumed from placement)
- Dignity (251), Brilliance (*λαμπρότης* 268), Climax (*ἀκμή* 272)
- Roughness (259–260), Vehemence (*σφοδρότης* 263), Truth (*ἀλήθεια* 363)
- Beauty (309), Pleasantness (*γλυκύτης* 339)

There are a few small overlaps, Rapidity and Bitterness (*δριμύτης*) both suggest avoiding hiatus. Pleasantness has many of the rhythmic features of Dignity including a specific suggestion of using the spondaic cadences and dactylic/anapestic rhythms characteristic of that type. This first aspect is in direct conflict with the advice it inherits from Beauty (*κάλλος*). Since however, it follows Beauty in many other respects, especially with respect to the *schema*, it seems useful to think of them as also linked here. Expansiveness lacks specific rhythmic characteristics, for which see *Peri Ideon* 295.

Grouping the *Ideai* according to Diction (λέξις) and Clause length.

There are generally fewer recommendations made with respect to Diction and clause length, but they complement the other categories well. Three groups can be usefully created from the stipulations about Diction. The first is those that follow the Diction of Clarity as laid out in *Peri Ideon* 229, that is to say Distinctness (εὐκρίνεια 240) and Simplicity (ἀφέλεια 328) which is followed generally by other Ideai of Character (ἥθος). The second is Dignity (247–49) followed by Brilliance (λαμπρότης 267). The third is Vehemence (σφοδρότης 262) followed by Climax (269), and Truth (359), and we might suppose that a similar set of stipulations applies for Roughness. With the exception of Truth these all also use metaphors, which is a hallmark of Dignity, but the use of harsh coined words is a more precise similarity. These correspond almost exactly to the groups suggested in the section on rhythmic groupings. Beauty and Rapidity also share a recommendation that short words be used, but this is not a very precise correspondence. The other *Ideai* either use unique advice with respect to Diction or do not have explicit statements on the subject.

Clause length can rather simply be summarised as being split into long, short, and unspecified clauses, the division is as follows:

Long	Short	Unspecified
Brilliance (λαμπρότης 268), Climax (ἀκμή 272), Beauty (χάλλος 307)	Clarity (229–232, 240), Dignity (σεμνότης 251), Roughness (τραχυτής 259), Vehemence (σφοδρότης 263), Simplicity (328), Pleasantness (γλυκύτης 219), Reasonableness (ἐπιείκεια 352), Truth (ἀλήθεια 363), (potentially Disgruntlement, βαρύτης and Bitterness, δριμύτης)	Expansiveness (περιβολή), Rapidity (γοργότης)

These therefore tend to form similar groups to those created by the correspondences in Figures, rather than rhythm. Comparing the groups, it is evident that the combinations formed here are an arrangement of the groupings seen in the Figures, whereas they would divide the groups based on Rhythm or Diction. The stipulations with respect to clause length and rhythm seem therefore to reveal two sets of stylistic groupings, suggesting an underlying pattern to Hermogenes’ thought on the stylistic groupings of the *Ideai*.

The Overall Structure of the *Peri Ideon*.

The *Peri Ideon*, therefore, has three different main structures of features. The first is evident in the titles of the *Ideai* given in the introduction, the *ennoia*, and the *methodos*, the second in the divisions in clause length and *Schema*, the third is most evident in the rhythm and diction characteristic of the *Idea*. It seems sensible on this basis to think of the *Ideai*, with respect to their top-level categorisation, as not exactly stylistic categories but rather an integrated category making precise recommendations based on strategic decisions by the speaker, reflecting Syrianus’ emphasis discussed above. The *Ideai* therefore do not map precisely onto stylistic groupings. This arrangement does however, approximate the structure given by Stavelas in his analysis of the conceptual structure of the *Ideai*. He argues for three parametrical levels one notional, one methodological, and one that follows the style as enunciated.⁴⁵ We might summarise this as follows, following his diagram on page 18:

- Thought: Thoughts
- Method: Approaches, Figures
- Convention: Diction, Clause length, Rhythm

This analysis loosely supports such a tripartite division, although stipulations of clause length would seem to be grouped in a manner that recalls the Figures rather than rhythm. Likewise, there are good arguments for seeing the Approaches as closer to Thoughts in a Hermogenean context.

⁴⁵ Stavelas (2014) 10–11, see also the diagram at Stavelas (2014) 18. This structure is not taken from the parallels in features but rather from the traditions and conceptual nature of the categories.

Hermogenes seems to make a distinction between Thoughts-Approaches and the remainder of the categories under the banner *Lexis* in his introduction *Peri Ideon Logou* 218 (in the second passage from 218 given above).⁴⁶ The similar treatment of them as idiosyncratic alongside the crossover between Thought and Approach discussed above would seem to support this. This problem is, however, outside of the scope of this paper, and more work is needed to establish the role of Approaches in this system. The structure as observed in this analysis according to correspondences in features may be summarised:

- Thought: Thoughts (Approaches)
- Figures: Figures, Clause Length
- Diction: Diction, Rhythm

This organisation may contribute to the enduring problems of categorising certain *Ideai* within groups. For example, Expansiveness is stated to operate independently of the other parts of Greatness ($\muέγεθος$).⁴⁷ As we have seen there are only small areas of stylistic overlap between the *Figures* (Figures) of Expansiveness and any other *Idea*, and no overlap in diction (no recommendations are given with respect to clause length or rhythm). Therefore, its independence is in its stylistic features not in its strategic deployment, and its combination with other *Ideai* is a hybridisation. Truth likewise is sometimes regarded as independent of Character ($\eta\thetaος$), sometimes a part of it. With respect to Figures and Diction it is clearly similar to Roughness or Vehemence ($\sigmaφοδρότης$), but the strategic goals of the two are quite different. The former two, parts of Greatness, have the aim of characterising the speaker’s opponent and case the latter of characterising the speaker themselves. These could be regarded, following Hermogenes’ reuse of rhetorical terminology in the names of the categories, as characteristic of Aristotle’s *pathos* as opposed to *ethos*.

⁴⁶ See discussions of *Methodos* in Patillon (1997) 114–116; Rutherford (1998) 14–16.

⁴⁷ For example, see the discussions of its place within Greatness in *Peri Ideon* 242.

Such a structure lends support to the argument that Hermogenes’ *Ideai* are closely related to Demetrius’ categories of style.⁴⁸ These also display a tendency towards top-level categorisations that elide similarities in stylistic qualities. For example, hyperbole is a feature of two of the four stylistic virtues (and discussed in a third) and one of the faults in the *De Elocutione*.⁴⁹ This division would also seem to support argues the interpretation of the *Ideai* as strategic ideals for practical use rather than purely abstract units of analysis.⁵⁰ It might also suggest that the challenging diversity in category names might be purely practical, and that there is value in the use of names that reflect but do not correspond to earlier terminology. The orator who has chosen a broad strategic approach, for example a straightforward, plain-speaking Lysianic defence speech, could easily find the proper stylistic guidance from the purer and plainer styles using categories that recall adjectives used to describe Lysias’ work. This might work in a manner similar to the way in which *stasis*-theory guidebooks would recommend a style of argument to the speaker based on the situation, and a comparison of these methods would be a good subject for future research. It also would suggest that the category Shrewdness (δεινότης), omitted for much of this analysis since it does not function like other *Ideai*, is not so distinct from the others as it may first appear. All the *Ideai* deal with strategy and using the right style at the right time, but Shrewdness reflects the cumulative effect of these choices throughout the speech. We are therefore left with a text whose practical value as a rhetorical aid is supported by its structure, and not undermined by its incongruity.

⁴⁸ A great deal of work has been done on this from other angles, for which see Patillon (1997) 105–112, 114–24. Rutherford (1998) 12–16 in particular argues for a close connection to Demetrius.

⁴⁹ Demetr. *Eloc.* 52 (elevation); 124–26 (frigidity); 161–63 (elegance); 282–86 (forcefulness).

⁵⁰ Potentially this might follow Stavelas’ conception of them as “codes of signs” For example, Stavelas 2014, 16 “It would be preferable either to regard them as codes and sub-codes of an aesthetic structure, relating to the oratorical deliverance of speech, or to consider the resolved ideas as codes of signs or as stylistic figures, since they elevate the stylistic forms signified from the linguistic to the aesthetic level, and to regard the seven major ideas as constructed systems of signs.”

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